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After a period of euphoria in the West, primarily related to hopes concerning Russian 
reforms, the previously fading image of the Russian threat is becoming visible once 
again, although the Western media have focused almost exclusively on one aspect--the 
extremist rhetoric of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his pro-imperialist compatriots in the 
recently elected Russian parliament. In fact, Russia has already initiated major actions 
to ensure a tougher Russian grip on Ukraine and Belarus', two of the more meaningful 
actors in the CIS, and has made stiffer demands on others to comply with Russian 
interests.
Assertions of Russian political-military involvement in ethno-political conflicts in the 
former Soviet republics have been disputed, with the Russian authorities repeatedly 
explaining away these charges as inspired by the (non-Russian) nationalists' 
conspiratorial mindset and speculation by the Western press.(l) However, with the 
accumulation of cogent evidence, a consistent picture of Russia's geostrategic game for 
domination in--and recently even beyond--the postSoviet space is becoming clear. The 
Transcaucasus region of the former Soviet Union, comprising the three republics of 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, has attracted particular attention in this respect.
Moscow's Views Disseminated
Less known is the fact that conventional views of the conflicts in the Caucasus (i.e., 
secessionist wars in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Azeri-
Armenian war over Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation in the breakaway Chechnia 
Republic, and ethnic clashes between the Ingush and North Ossetian autonomies in the 
south of Russia) mainly have been created and disseminated globally by Russian 
television, which constitutes a unique, ubiquitous and dominating force in the post-
Soviet information space.(2) For many years the Caucasus region had been perceived 
by the external world as virtually indistinguishable from Russia. Even the Western news 
reporters on the spot, let alone foreign policy analysts, with no knowledge of the local 
languages and very little background information, were largely influenced and 
conditioned by what they saw on television programs from Moscow. They were scarcely 
capable of imagining the degree of subjectivity both in supposedly factual live reports 
and in commentary.
The Republic of Georgia, a tiny spot on the post-Soviet political map, came to attract 
international attention largely because of two circumstances, i.e., almost permanent 
turmoil since the disintegration of the Soviet Union (following a year of bizarre ethno-
nationalist rule by former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia),(3) and the leadership of 
Eduard Shevardnadze, former Soviet Foreign Minister and principal confederate of 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Now Georgia seems likely to be viewed as a model of a failed state.
Renewed Russian Military Presence
In Soviet times, Georgia was best known for its excellent theater, cinema and fine arts. 
The Georgians' devotion to the arts apparently had sublimated the negative forces that 
had accumulated during almost two centuries of imperial Russian domination. However, 
since the decline of the Soviet empire, Georgians have been so committed to displaying 
melodramatic apprehension and antagonism in their relationships with the Russians(4) 
that Georgia became a victim of self-fulfilling prophecy. Russia increased its covert 
support for rebel and separatist minority groups until it was able to reestablish its 
military presence and implement a political dictate involving the virtual decomposition of 
the Caucasian republic.
Shevardnadze had remarked repeatedly that the destiny of Georgia was being decided 
in Abkhazia, and he was right in his view. This ancient and fertile land has for centuries 
been settled by various ethnic groups, among which the Abkhazians and Georgians are 
both indigenous.(5) Beneath the traditionally tolerant relations between the two peoples 
(attested by many mixed marriages) glimmered sparks that in a few years blazed up 
into an incredible degree of anti-Georgian hatred comparable to the ethnic antagonisms 
in Bosnia The nationalist "Georgia for the Georgians" hysteria launched by the Zviadists 
(followers of Gamsakhurdia) played a decisive role in bringing about this process.
The Russians have concentrated on backing the procommunist Abkhaz secessionist 
leadership of this breakaway Georgian region (with its long stretch of Black Sea 
shoreline), not least in view of Russia's complicated relationship with Ukraine (which 
threatens to reduce Russia's control of the Black Sea).(6)
A clumsy attempt by Georgian government troops on August 14-15, 1992, to restore 
order in the Abkhaz capital Sukhumi gave rise to a bloody year-long war that resulted in 
over 200,000 refugees and forcibly displaced persons (mainly ethnic Georgians). The 
secessionist Abkhaz stronghold of Gudauta remained "miraculously" free of the 
shortages, anarchy and famine that had spread all over Georgia.(7) The government 
repeatedly appealed to the UN, CSCE, and other international organizations to 
intervene, while at the same time refusing offers of Russian military assistance. Several 
UN Security Council resolutions and decisions failed to lead to a de-escalation of the 
conflict. On July 27, 1993, a Russian brokered trilateral agreement on a cease-fire and 
principles for the solution of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was signed. Complete 
demilitarization of the region, supervised by Russia, was to follow the separation of the 
military forces of the two sides. However, the UN failed to implement its long sought 
decision to send a large group of military observers to Abkhazia. Furthermore, the 
Russian military observers insisted that Georgians did not participate in the supervision 
of the withdrawal of heavy weaponry.
Russian Arms for Abkhazia
At the end of August 1993,S. Shoigu, chairman of the Russian Emergency State 
Committee, declared on Russian television that demilitarization had reached a stage at 
which resumption of the war would be impossible. Large numbers of hopeful refugees 
returned to their ruined homes and began rebuilding. Then on September 17, a surprise 
attack by Abkhaz tanks and artillery, supported by their Russian North Caucasian and 
Cossack allies, forced the remaining disarmed Georgian troops, together with tens of 
thousands of civilians, to flee in panic. Many of these victims later starved or froze to 
death in the Svaneti mountains. Shevardnadze himself, who was besieged along with 
the defenders of Sukhumi, had a narrow escape. The sudden clandestine Abkhaz 
rearmament remains a mystery only for the extremely naive.(8)
The war ended in late September 1993 with Abkhazia's virtual secession from Georgia 
through a radical ethnic cleansing of its multi-ethnic population and the destruction of its 
cities, including Sukhumi. After this, facing a new insurgency in Western Georgia led by 
deposed president Gamsakhurdia (who was trying to profit from the desperate situation 
in the country), Shevardnadze was obliged to trade Georgia's independence (by joining 
the Russian-controlled CIS) for Russian military assistance. Included in Russia's price 
was the establishment of three Russian military bases on Georgian territory.
Moscow Manipulates N-K Conflict
Self-sustainability and outside manipulation have been the features of the oldest (since 
1989) and bloodiest (over 15,000 casualties and almost 1.5 million refugees) 
ethnopolitical conflict over the ethnically Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh region in 
Azerbaijan. The futility of international efforts to deal with the conflict has been evident 
in this case also.(9) Azerbaijan's pro-Turkish president Abulfaz Elchibey was deposed in 
a military coup in June 1993, a couple of days before he was due to sign a major treaty 
opening the door for Western investors to Azerbaijan's large oil deposits. Elchibey was 
replaced by Geidar Aliev, the former communist ruler of Azerbaijan, who immediately 
suspended the Western investments and signed a treaty with Russia instead.
The natural question arises why the Russian Federation should be interested in 
manipulating and aggravating ethnic conflicts in neighboring newly independent 
republics in view of the contagious character of such conflicts and the instability already 
existing in what is still the largest country in the world. In order to respond to this 
question, one needs to distinguish between the forces that formally define and those 
that actually determine Russian strategies. It is not necessary to assume a single 
rational actor behind the whole complex picture. Rather, one may assume that a 
statistically sufficient synergy between the Russian military, the security apparatus, the 
legislature and voter sentiment "hath done this deed."
Could the process whereby former Soviet republics tried to obtain independence have 
been more successful politically and less disastrous in its consequences for their 
populations? As it turned out, ethnic nationalism was the only force on the political 
palette, both in the Baltic region and the Caucasus-- the foremost regions in terms of 
the desire to be free of Soviet rule--that animated the politically active sections of 
society. (The Baltic nations, however, were fortunate enough to enjoy the support of the 
West.) Soviet totalitarian rule was unable to produce anything but its own disguised and 
distorted reflections in the social consciousness of the various peoples. Democratically 
minded movements and parties lacked the fervor and ruthlessness to satisfy mass 
expectations. The revival of democratic organizations is essential for the future of the 
Caucasus--if there is to be any acceptable future for this tormented part of the globe.
Notes:
1 Insightful comments can be found in S . Neil MacFarlane, "Russia, the West and 
European Security,"Survival, vol. 35, no. 3, Autumn 1993.
2 Remarkably, while cutting energy and fuel supplies to Belarus', Ukraine and other 
debtor republics, the Russian government has repeatedly shown a readiness to forgive 
arrears of payment for relaying the Russian TV channels.
3 An accurate account of this period can be found in Stephen F. Jones, "Georgia: A 
Failed Democratic Transition," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds.), Nation and Politics 
in the Soviet Successor States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
4 The sessions of the Georgian parliament and the press controlled by the political 
parties had exploited a mythic picture of Russia as Georgia's only eternal and 
formidable enemy, which tightened its grip every time that Georgia gathered forces for a 
breakthrough to independence. Remarkably, the answer to this was found not in wise 
policies, but rather in self-sacrificial actions capable of impressing the decision-making 
and aid-providing West: "We prefer to die than to live in slavery." The people, though, 
were not properly asked about what they would prefer: there was a successful 
referendum for independence, but there could not be a referendum for collective 
suicide.
5 According to the 1989 census, out of Abkhazia's total population of 524,000, fewer 
than 91,000--17 percent--were ethnic Abkhazians, 46 percent being Georgians (prior to 
the recent "ethnic cleansing" that expelled most Georgians), 15 percent being 
Armenians, 14 percent Russians, and 8 percent others. (ed.)
6 See Misha Glenny, "The Bear in the Caucasus: From Georgian Chaos, Russian 
Order," Harper's Magazine, March 1994.
7 Russian support for the Abkhaz secessionists is well illustrated in Sergei 
Mostovshchikov 's article "State of War," Izvestia, July 2728, 1993.
8 Fewer than 91,000 Abkhaz secessionists suddenly had a modern airforce, including 
Russian SU-25 attack planes that bombed the port of Sukhumi while it was still held by 
Georgian forces. (ed.)
9 In 1992-93 alone there were 10 failed international initiatives over Nagorno-Karabakh 
(see Moscow News, No. 23, 1993).
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